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Note 
Effectiveness of Labor Provisions within Free 
Trade Agreements Between the United States and 
Latin American Countries 
Cayla D. Ebert 
The state of human rights around the globe has become 
more visible and a high priority for many due to the financial 
crisis of 2008, recent and current political and military conflict, 
globalization, raised awareness, and new technology and 
communications.1 This has occurred through the increase in 
national and international watchdog organizations,2 
international laws and treaties that can trigger “transnational 
cooperation between governments,”3 and the era of twenty-four-
hour news and social media.4 It is at the crossroads of human 
 
  Cayla D. Ebert is a 2018 J.D. Candidate at the University of Minnesota 
Law School. She graduated from Indiana University Bloomington in 2015 with 
Highest Distinction and holds B.A.s in Sociology, Criminal Justice, and 
Spanish. Ebert is pursuing a career in International Trade regulatory work. She 
would like to thank Professor Christopher Soper who served as her advisor 
during the writing process, the entire Minnesota Journal of International Law 
Staff who helped edit this Note, and her family and friends who have supported 
her in her writing and law school career. 
 1. See generally Daniel Drache & Lesley A. Jacobs, Introduction, in 
LINKING GLOBAL TRADE AND HUMAN RIGHTS: NEW POLICY SPACE IN HARD 
ECONOMIC TIMES [hereinafter LINKING GLOBAL TRADE AND HUMAN RIGHTS] 1, 
1–10 (2014) (explaining that the 2008 financial crisis state action extended into 
new areas and put a focus on failure of government protections); Dinah Shelton, 
Protecting Human Rights in a Globalized World, 25 B.C. INT’L COMP. L. REV. 
273 (2002) (addressing the intersections of globalization and promotion and 
violation of human rights). 
 2. See Robert Charles Blitt, Who Will Watch the Watchdogs? Human 
Rights Nongovernmental Organizations and the Case for Regulation, 10 BUFF. 
HUM. RTS. L. REV. 261, 261–79 (2004) (discussing the emergence of 
intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations that serves as 
watchdogs to human rights). 
 3. Drache et al., supra note 1, at 11. 
 4. See generally Christoph Koettl, Twitter to the Rescue? How Social 
Media is Transforming Human Rights Monitoring, AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL: 
HUMAN RIGHTS NOW (Feb. 20, 2013), http://blog.amnestyusa.org/middle-
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rights and international treaties where this note will focus; 
when labor rights provisions are included in trade agreements. 
Due to the changing nature of international trade relations, 
agreements are becoming more and more comprehensive. 
Overall, in recent decades there has been a shift away from 
multilateralism toward bilateralism and plurilateralism in 
trade relations between states due to the failed multilateral 
negotiations of the World Trade Organization (WTO) at the 
Seattle Ministerial Conference in 1990.5 The trend towards 
bilateralism and plurilateralism is reinforced by states’ ability 
to go beyond the coverage of the WTO and reach “a new level of 
international policy-making,”6 and creates a “domino effect” 
further undermining large scale multilateral treaty 
negotiations.7 These formats allow the agreements to be more 
flexible and have a much broader scope to include issues such as 
investment provisions, intellectual property rights, 
environmental protection, and human rights protection.8 
Human rights protections within trade treaties, the focus of 
this Note, generally take the form of labor rights provisions. The 
United States’ policy can be generally categorized into four 
stages regarding such provisions. The United States-Chile 
Agreement and the United States-Colombia Agreement, used as 
 
east/twitter-to-the-rescue-how-social-media-is-transforming-human-rights-
monitoring/ (discussing how social media is used to monitor human rights 
emergencies and for evidence of human rights violations). 
 5. See Simon Lester, Bryan Mercurio & Lorand Bartels, Introduction, in 
BILATERAL AND REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS: COMMENTARY AND ANALYSIS 
3, 3–5 [hereinafter BILATERAL AND REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS] (Simon 
Lester, Bryan Mercurio & Lorand Bartels eds., 2015). Before 1999 it was 
uncommon for the major trading powers to sign bilateral agreements, but 
following the failure of the WTO negotiations, “all major trading nations 
(including the East Asian nations) almost immediately launched multiple 
negotiations.” Id. at 3. The steep increase in bilateral agreements “has created 
a competitive process among nations, with all of the major trading powers 
pushing hard to conclude these agreements so as not to lose particular markets 
to their competitors.” Id. at 4. There has also been an increase in plurilateral or 
semi-regional agreements, often between states within proximity to each other, 
but not always. See id. But, it is important to note that bilateral PTAs are not 
entirely new, as it was the predominant form of trade agreements in the 1800’s 
and was ushered away by a wave of multilateralism during and after the World 
Wars. See id. at 3. 
 6. Id. at 5. 
 7. David Evans, Bilateral and Plurilateral PTAs, in BILATERAL AND 
REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS, supra note 5, at 53, 53–73 (explaining that as 
more countries engage in PTAs, the cost of staying on the sidelines increases 
because of the continued failure of multilateral negotiations at the WTO). 
 8. Lester et al., supra note 5, at 5. 
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case studies in this analysis, fall into the third and fourth 
generations of these types of provisions. Their structure, 
effectiveness, and consequences will be discussed in detail. 
The goal of this Note is to address the effectiveness of labor 
rights provisions within bilateral free trade agreements (FTAs) 
between the United States and Latin American countries. 
Section I seeks to explain free trade agreements briefly, why 
they have popularized and evolved over time, how human rights, 
specifically labor rights, have been included, and why parties 
agree to them. Section II will examine the structure of labor 
provisions within FTAs more in-depth, and focus on two 
agreements, the United States-Chile Free Trade Agreement and 
the United States-Colombia Trade Promotion Agreement. While 
many measurements of labor rights are used in this Note, it will 
analyze the two agreements in the context of domestic 
legislation and policies put into place, and the enforcement 
thereof, specifically looking at freedom of association, minimum 
wage, and working conditions, among other labor rights. 
Through this analysis, this Note argues that FTAs including 
hard labor standards are more effective than those including soft 
standards, but only countries with decent current labor rights 
laws will agree to such treaties, therefore undermining the 
effectiveness. Section II proposes implementing labor provisions 
within FTAs on a graduated scale in exchange for economic 
benefits such as tariff elimination as a solution to this problem. 
Due to the increasing popularity and use of FTAs to not only 
achieve economic benefits, but also human rights progress, this 
Note concludes the current language of such agreements is 
insufficient to enact the maximum potential change and 
therefore the provisions should be implemented using different 
mechanisms. 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. REGIONAL FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS AND PREFERENTIAL 
TRADE AGREEMENTS 
In recent decades, world trade has seen a shift away from 
large multilateral trade agreements, usually negotiated and 
ratified through the WTO, towards regional and bilateral FTAs, 
or what some refer to as preferential trade agreements (PTAs).9 
 
 9. “Free trade agreements” (FTAs) is the most commonly used term for 
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This shift has been due to various economic and political 
reasons, but the most significant is the failure of the recent and 
still-ongoing WTO negotiation round at Doha.10 A multilateral 
agreement has yet to be achieved as the developed and 
undeveloped countries are unable to reach a “collective position 
on provisions regarding trade liberalization which needed to be 
included in the future multi-trading system.”11 While the 
majority of the disagreement involves agriculture subsidies and 
tariffs, under the collective WTO system, for an agreement to 
enter into force, it must be concluded and agreed to by all WTO 
members; essentially, all states must agree on everything.12 
Since 1999, the number of bilateral agreements has increased 
rapidly and “created a competitive process among nations, with 
all of the major trading powers pushing hard to conclude these 
agreements so as not to lose particular markets to their 
competitors.”13 In 1995, forty-two percent of exported goods were 
being traded under a bilateral or regional FTA, and in 2014, this 
had increased to fifty-five percent of exported goods.14 
This trend suggests there is a “more effective means of 
market opening than multilateral trade negotiations.”15 This 
shift has made international trade rules highly complex and 
hierarchical including the original WTO agreement and rules (of 
which 161 countries are members), regional trade integrations 
 
trade agreements, but not all agreements create free trade, some create 
discriminatory trade, and it does not include all trade structures, such as 
customs unions, which is why the term “preferential trade agreements” (PTAs) 
was created. Lester et al., supra note 5, at 5. 
 10. Jorge Heine & Joseph F. Turcotte, Free Trade Agreements and Global 
Policy Space after the Great Recession, in LINKING GLOBAL TRADE AND HUMAN 
RIGHTS, supra note 1, at 65, 71–72 (“[N]egotiational stalemate is symptomatic 
of the diametrically opposed beliefs on the nature of the Round between 
developed and developing countries.”). The Round was launched at the WTO’s 
Fourth Ministerial Conference in Qatar in November 2001 with the main focus 
on the needs of developing countries. The Doha Round, WORLD TRADE ORG. 
[hereinafter WTO], https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dda_e/dda_e.htm 
(last visited Sept. 19, 2017). 
 11. Beginda Pakpahan, Deadlock in the WTO: What is next?, WTO, 
https://www.wto.org/english/forums_e/public_forum12_e/art_pf12_e/art19.htm 
(last visited Sept. 19, 2017). 
 12. See id.; World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 14 
November 2001, WTO Doc. WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, 41 ILM 746 (2002) ¶ 47. 
 13. Lester et al., supra note 5, at 4. 
 14. INT’L LABOUR ORG., STUDIES ON GROWTH WITH EQUITY: ASSESSMENT 
OF LABOUR PROVISIONS IN TRADE AND INVESTMENT ARRANGEMENTS 1 (2016), 
http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---dgreports/---inst/documents/
publication/wcms_498944.pdf. 
 15. Heine & Turcotte, supra note 10, at 75. 
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or customs unions (e.g. European Union), and the loose regional 
and bilateral free trade agreements.16 In sum, there are over 400 
agreements, which can be very extensive, reaching not only into 
a state’s domestic trade policies, but also to its human rights 
standards, intellectual property rights, environmental 
standards, and anti-competition laws.17 Some agreements are 
more narrowly focused, while others can be more comprehensive. 
Examples include the Australia-Chile FTA (includes IP 
provisions), Central America-Dominican Republic-United States 
Free Trade Agreement (includes labor rights provisions), and the 
United States Colombia Trade Promotion Agreement (includes 
labor and environmental protections and IP rights).18 Some 
scholars argue that “FTAs are seen as a key instrument to assert 
domestic interests at the bilateral level and secure mutually 
beneficial results” and promote growth.19 
One policy argument in favor of liberalized trade, or free 
trade, for the Latin American region is that “free (or freer) 
competition will inevitably foster economic development” 
because it lowers consumer prices, and increases industry 
efficiency and productivity.20 Both things are said to boost the 
domestic economy and make domestic products more 
competitive abroad, which would in turn boost domestic 
employment and increase foreign investment.21 Other commonly 
cited pro-liberalized trade arguments stipulate that it creates 
 
 16. Lester et al., supra note 5, at 4. 
 17. Id. at 4–5. 
 18. Australia-Chile FTA, AUS. GOV’T, DEP’T OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND 
TRADE, http://dfat.gov.au/trade/agreements/aclfta/Pages/australia-chile-fta.
aspx (last visited Sept. 19, 2017); CAFTA-DR (Dominican Republic-Central 
America FTA), OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, https://ustr.gov
/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/cafta-dr-dominican-republic-central-
america-fta (last visited Sept. 19, 2017); United States-Colombia Trade 
Promotion Agreement, OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, https://
ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/colombia-tpa (last visited 
Sept. 19, 2017). 
 19. Heine & Turcotte, supra note 10, at 65. See also INT’L LABOUR ORG, 
supra note 14, at 13. 
 20. Thomas H. Hill, Introduction to Law and Economic Development in 
Latin America: A Comparative Approach to Legal Reform, 83 CHI-KENT L. REV. 
3, 11 (2008). See generally Eddy Lee, Trade Liberalization and Employment, 
U.N. DEP’T OF ECON. AND SOCIAL AFFAIRS, (Oct. 2005), http://www.un.org/
esa/desa/papers/2005/wp5_2005.pdf (referring to agreements that reduce or 
eliminate tariffs and encourage free movement of goods and services as 
liberalized trade). 
 21. Hill, supra note 20, at 11–12. 
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specialization22 and economies of scale,23 allowing countries to 
have a comparative advantage in a certain good or service area, 
which increases efficiency and reduces the amount of resources 
used in production, and that it creates an overall higher 
standard of living. Comparative advantage in the trade context 
is the idea that countries will produce goods in the area in which 
their economy and resources give them the largest margin of 
advantage in comparison to other countries.24 Bilateral 
agreements, specifically, allow for more flexibility, therefore 
allowing for some of these protectionist characteristics. Two 
main reasons are defensive interests where “sensitive sectors 
can be carved out of the agreement” and offensive interests 
where “new disciplines can be promoted in some sectors of high 
interest where multilateral consensus is yet to emerge.”25 
Opponents to liberalized trade, specifically through regional 
or bilateral agreements, argue that it leads to trade diversion, 
rather than trade creation, which in turn reduces the overall 
welfare of the country.26 Trade diversion is the idea that 
reduction of trade barriers between two or a few countries leads 
only to exchange between the member states and disincentivizes 
countries to trade with those outside of their agreements.27 
Studies have shown empirical proof of trade diversion such as in 
Mercosur,28 where the largest increase in intra-regional trade 
during the early 1990’s was in countries that lack comparative 
 
 22. Specialization was an early idea and strategy in trade. Plato explains 
trade specialization: “So the conclusion is that more things will be produced and 
the work be more easily and better done, when every man is set free from all 
other occupations to do, at the right time, the one thing for which he is natural 
fitted.” Gilbert R. Winham, The Evolution of the World Trading System – The 
Economic and Policy Context, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL 
TRADE LAW 5, 8 (Daniel Bethlehem et al. eds., 2009). 
 23. See JOOST H.B. PAUWELYN, ANDREW GUZMAN & JENNIFER A. HILLMAN, 
INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW 11–17 (3d ed. 2016). 
 24. Id. at 11–13. 
 25. Olivier Cattaneo, The Political Economy of PTAs, in BILATERAL AND 
REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS: COMMENTARY AND ANALYSIS 28, 37 (Simon 
Lester, Bryan Mercurio & Lorand Bartels eds., 2015). 
 26. Prof Rajagopal, Where Did the Trade Liberalization Drive Latin 
American Economy: A Cross Section Analysis, 6–2, APPLIED ECONOMETRICS & 
INT’L DEV. 89, 90 (2006). 
 27. See PAUWELYN ET AL., supra note 23, at 371. 
 28. Claire Felter & Danielle Renwick, Mercosur: South America’s Fractious 
Trade Bloc, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS (Sept. 13, 2017), 
https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/mercosur-south-americas-fractious-trade-
bloc (“Mercosur is an economic and political bloc comprising of Argentina, 
Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay, and Venezuela.”). 
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advantage.29 Opponents argue that trade creation would have 
increased countries’ comparative advantage, or the largest 
increase in trade would have been seen in those countries that 
have a large comparative advantage. 
B. HUMAN RIGHTS PROVISIONS WITHIN PREFERENTIAL TRADE 
AGREEMENTS 
Latin America (which includes Central America, South 
America and sometimes the Caribbean) has extremely low 
economic growth rates as compared to other regions of the world, 
even developing regions.30 But, Latin American economies are 
categorized by periods of growth and then major setbacks.31 A 
general sentiment of today’s capitalistic world is “let the market 
be free, and human rights will follow,” assuming that human 
rights come second to trade and economic growth.32 Evidence of 
this shows through the previous FTAs signed with developing 
Latin American countries as they have only focused on economic 
matters in the past.33 To combat some of this idea and the 
potential negative backlash and consequences of liberalized 
trade, and also spark growth, there has been an increase of 
countries including additional non-trade specific provisions 
within FTAs and PTAs. The agreements, as mentioned before, 
now tend to include other provisions including intellectual 
property rights, environmental standards, and anti-competition 
laws. Parties now try to “piggy back” liberalization with human 
rights ideals in trade agreements, mostly through the addition 
of labor rights provisions.34 These provisions also serve a highly 
political function for agreements and attempt to provide 
protection for all parties. 
In 1994, the North America Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA) was the first FTA to include human rights provisions, 
and every United States agreement since has included some 
 
 29. Pravin Krishna, The Economics of PTAs, in BILATERAL AND REGIONAL 
TRADE AGREEMENTS: COMMENTARY AND ANALYSIS 11, 15 (Simon Lester, Bryan 
Mercurio & Lorand Bartels eds., 2015). 
 30. Hill, supra note 20, at 6. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Marcilio Toscano Franca-Filho, et al., Protection of Fundamental Rights 
in Latin American FTAs and MERCOSUR, 20 EURO L. J. 811, 811 (2014). 
 33. Id. at 815. 
 34. Id. at 812. 
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human rights provisions.35 Technically, labor rights were added 
to NAFTA through a separate, supplemental document titled the 
North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation (NAALC).36 
The purpose of the sub-agreement is to “improve working 
conditions and living standards” in Canada, Mexico, and the 
United States and to “resolve issues in a cooperative manner.”37 
The Agreement creates both international (the Commission for 
Labor Cooperation) and domestic institutions (National 
Administrative Offices) to work together on labor issues through 
“cooperative consultations.”38 Such issues “includ[e] 
occupational safety and health, child labor, benefits for workers, 
minimum wages, industrial relations, legislation on the 
formation of unions and the resolution of labor disputes.”39 The 
NAALC obligates parties to: 1) ensure that its labor laws and 
regulations provide for high labor standards and to continue to 
strive to improve those standards; 2) promote compliance with 
and effectively enforce its labor law through appropriate 
government action; 3) ensure that persons with a legally 
recognized interest have appropriate access to administrative, 
quasi-judicial, judicial, or labor tribunals for enforcement of its 
labor law and that proceedings for the enforcement of its labor 
law are fair, equitable and transparent; and 4) ensure that its 
labor laws, regulations, procedures, and administrative rulings 
of general application are promptly published or otherwise made 
available to the public and promote public awareness of its labor 
law.40 
As of 2002, the United States includes such provisions in all 
trade agreements, but the depth, scope, and enforceability of 
them varies greatly.41 As of December 2015, there were 76 trade 
agreements in place, which covered 135 economies, which 
include labor provisions.42 Over eighty percent of trade 
agreements entered into since 2013 include human rights 
provisions.43 
 
 35. INT’L LABOUR ORG., supra note 14, at 1, 42. 
 36. North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation: A Guide, U.S. DEP’T 
OF LABOR (Oct. 2005), https://www.dol.gov/ilab/trade/agreements/naalcgd.htm. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. See also North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation, Can.-
Mex.-U.S., Sept. 1993, 32 I.L.M. 1499. 
 41. INT’L LABOUR ORG., supra note 14, at 45. 
 42. INT’L LABOUR ORG., supra note 14, at 1. 
 43. Id. See also id. at 11 (“Labor provisions are defined as any standard 
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Not all human rights provisions included within treaties are 
similar and the subject sparks much debate.44 In particular, the 
United States and its trade partners tend to focus more on 
workers’ and children’s rights, whereas European agreements 
tend to focus more on fundamental freedoms and rights.45 The 
United States has two basic models for specific enumeration of 
labor rights within their treaties; the first, what some will call 
more soft standards, and the second, hard (or enforceable) 
standards.46 The first, which can be seen in NAFTA, or the 
NAALC, is a long list of theoretical labor principles and 
standards and usually an agreement of the parties to follow their 
own labor laws.47 In NAFTA, eleven labor principles were listed 
but only three were made actionable through dispute resolution 
and enforcement mechanisms.48 Soft standards usually refer to 
the “simple mentioning of human rights practices in a treaty, 
while an enforcement mechanism is not given.”49 The second 
model is a result of the United States Congress’ “New Trade 
Policy with America” in which labor rights provisions include 
five principles, all of which are actionable.50 These principles 
follow the International Labour Organization’s (ILO) 
Fundamental Labour Rights and include: “1) freedom of 
 
which addresses labor relations or minimum working terms or conditions, 
mechanisms for monitoring or promoting compliance, and or a framework for 
cooperation.”). 
 44. See Robert A. Rogowsky and Eric Chyn, U.S. Trade Law and FTAs: A 
Survey of Labor Requirements, 1 J. INT’L COM. & ECON. 113, 115 (2008). “Trade 
agreements and trade promotion authority hang precariously on (1) the 
inclusion of labor rights in future negotiations and on (2) the question whether 
workers would be better off with more or with fewer trade agreements.” Id. 
 45. Franca-Filho et al., supra note 32, at 814. 
 46. EMILIE M. HAFNER-BURTON, FORCED TO BE GOOD: WHY TRADE 
AGREEMENTS BOOST HUMAN RIGHTS 142 (2009) (citing EMILIE M. HAFNER-
BURTON, TRADING HUMAN RIGHTS: HOW PREFERENTIAL TRADE 
ARRANGEMENTS INFLUENCE GOVERNMENT REPRESSION (2005)). These models 
can loosely be compared to hard and soft international law where the former 
refers to actual binding legal instruments and the latter carries no legally 
binding force. See generally Gregory C. Shaffer & Mark A. Pollack, Hard Vs. 
Soft Law: Alternatives, Complements, and Antagonists in International 
Governance, 94 MINN. L. REV. 706, 712–16 (2009). 
 47. Joshua M. Kagan, Making Free Trade Fair: How the WTO Could 
Incorporate Labor Rights and Why It Should, 43 GEO. J. INT’L L. 195, 213–15 
(2011). 
 48. Id. 
 49. Gabriele Spilker & Tobias Bohmelt, The Impact of Preferential Trade 
Agreements on Governmental Repression Revisited, 8 REV. INT’L ORGS. 343, 344 
n. 1 (2013). 
 50. Kagan, supra note 47, at 214. 
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association; 2) the effective recognition of the right to collective 
bargaining; 3) the elimination of all forms of compulsory or 
forced labor; 4) the effective abolition of child labor and a 
prohibition on the worst forms of child labor; and 5) the 
elimination of discrimination in respect of employment and 
occupation.”51 This model creates rights that cannot be 
derogated or waived and can be seen in numerous FTAs 
concluded by the United States including those with Peru, 
Korea, Panama, and Colombia.52 Almost all agreements require 
the parties to maintain their current labor standards, and to 
ensure that “laws are effectively enforced and are consistent 
with certain labour standards,” but earlier agreements, or soft 
standards agreements, do not necessarily require states to 
increase them. 53 
The United States’ labor provisions policy has changed over 
the years and can be generally categorized into four different 
“generations” of provisions.54 The first generation includes 
commitment to the eleven labor principles as seen in NAFTA 
and to follow domestic labor laws.55 The second, which is 
exemplified by the United States-Jordan agreement (2000), 
references the 1998 ILO Declaration and “internationally 
recognized labor rights.”56 This generation also introduces a 
commitment of the parties to “not waive or derogate from 
domestic labour laws as a means to encourage trade” and “the 
labour rights and principles referred to in the agreement are 
recognized and protected by domestic law.”57 The third 
generation of United States labor provisions within agreements 
includes those signed between 2003 and 2006 with Australia, 
Bahrain, Chile, and the Dominican Republic.58 The shift was due 
to the policy change in 2002, described above, that resulted in 
promotion of worker’s rights and the rights of children consistent 
with the ILO labor standards.59 They do include some procedural 
guarantees but there is no recourse through dispute settlement 
 
 51. Id. See also ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at 
Work and its Follow Up, International Labour Conference, 86th Session, (June 
18, 1998, Annex revised June 15, 2010). 
 52. Kagan, supra note 47. 
 53. INT’L LABOUR ORG., supra note 14, at 2. 
 54. Id. at 42. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. at 43. 
 57. Id. 
 58. INT’L LABOUR ORG., supra note 14, at 43. 
 59. Id. 
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mechanisms.60 Finally, the fourth and most recent generation of 
provisions can be found in the agreements signed after 2006, 
including those with Colombia, Korea, Panama, and Peru. These 
agreements recognized each fundamental principle of labor 
rights laid out by the ILO, and the parties agreed to incorporate 
and enforce these rights under domestic labor laws.61 This last 
generation also provides for dispute resolution through 
arbitration for all provisions, thereby strengthening the parties’ 
obligations to comply.62 
Recent United States FTAs rely mostly on cross-state 
reporting as their enforcement or monitoring system. This 
allows individuals or non-state entities to file submissions with 
their domestic state-party alleging that another state party has 
violated the agreement’s labor obligations, and then that state 
will decide if they will pursue the claim.63 Remedies that may 
result from dispute resolution may take the form of 
implementation of standards, compensation, or retaliation, 
depending on the parties’ agreement.64 While implementation 
mechanisms at the domestic level are crucial in the application 
of these provisions, in practice, existing dispute resolution 
mechanisms are rarely used.65 As of 2016, the only state-to-state 
arbitration for the enforcement of labor provisions is the 
arbitration happening between the United States and 
Guatemala.66 
C. STATES’ REASONS FOR INCLUSION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 
PROVISIONS IN TRADE AGREEMENTS 
These provisions have been viewed as unilateral, because 
large powerful states such as the United States or the European 
Union can attach labor provisions to the agreements and 
developing countries have no choice but to meet certain criteria 
to gain access to a beneficial market.67 In some ways though, this 
increases the effectiveness of such provisions. It appears these 
types of agreements are mostly concluded by a large state that 
 
 60. Id. at 44. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. at 45. 
 63. Kagan, supra note 47, at 215. 
 64. Id. at 220. 
 65. INT’L LABOUR ORG., supra note 14, at 2, 5. 
 66. Id. at 45. 
 67. Id. at 15. 
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has respectable labor practices and a small state that has poor 
practices, but similar treaties have been concluded between 
states with poor human rights records. But, why do parties 
include these provisions in the first place? Each side of the 
agreement has their own reasons for pursuing such treaties, and 
not all are based in an altruistic goal of protecting laborers. 
The first reason is self-explanatory, to increase and protect 
human rights, especially in the Latin American region.68 The 
region’s “income inequality levels are among the highest in the 
world,” which are related to low growth, poor education, and 
economic volatility, among other factors.69 Inclusion of labor 
rights in particular can help prevent a “race to the bottom,” or 
pressure to decrease labor standards across the board.70 A 
common anti-trade argument postulates that exporting 
countries will lower labor standards in order to gain a 
comparative advantage over countries who respect labor 
rights.71 While it is unlikely that a developed country would 
lower its standards, there is a higher risk for developing 
countries who are seeking foreign investment.72 Contrary to this 
argument, however, countries with weak core labor standards 
generally tend to have very little foreign direct investment.73 
This may be due to an increase of corporate social 
responsibility74 and the consequences of negative publicity 
involving the treatment of workers. The inclusion of social 
aspects to international agreements is a step toward combatting 
these issues and increasing the overall value of life for the 
region. But of course, human rights issues take the back seat in 
such agreements due to the economic and political nature of 
them. 
 
 
 
 68. Rogowsky & Chyn, supra note 44, at 117 (“[P]olls consistently show that 
Americans support trade liberalization when it leads to improved conditions for 
foreign and domestic workers.”). 
 69. Franca-Filho, et al., supra note 32, at 816. 
 70. Kagan, supra note 47, at 201. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. at 202. 
 73. Id. at 203. 
 74. Antonio Vives, Corporate Social Responsibility: The Role of Law and 
Markets and the Case of Developing Countries, 83 CHI. KENT L. REV. 199, 201 
(2008) (explaining that The idea of corporate social responsibility holds that a 
corporation is “responsible for the impact of its activities” and has an obligation 
to carry out those activities “with respect toward those affected.”). 
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The second reason hinges more on domestic policy strategy 
and congressional support.75 Linking trade agreements and 
trade liberalization with social rights tends to allow for more 
domestic support of such an agreement, therefore catering to the 
policymakers.76 For instance, in the United States, the power of 
the labor unions in Congress at the time the treaties are formed 
has significant effects. American labor unions tend to oppose free 
trade agreements and argue they have negative effects,77 
support protectionist policies and oppose provisions which could 
lead to a “race to the bottom” in terms of costs, and consequently, 
labor rights and workers’ welfare.78 Labor protections are then 
needed to increase the cost of labor and therefore control 
competition between states, theoretically protecting American 
jobs. On the other hand, corporate influence in Congress has a 
significant effect as well in pushing these agreements through. 
FTAs provide multi-national corporations many benefits and 
unique legal rights such as ISDS and the ability to use cheap 
labor sources.79 Some liberal American lawmakers, Latin 
American countries, and human rights groups tend to have 
domestic support in favor of labor standards provisions in FTAs 
because they intend to serve as an enforcement mechanism.80 As 
American and other western companies move their 
manufacturing facilities to Latin America, Latin workers then 
have more choices of where to work, and naturally, they chose 
the western companies which are obligated to enforce high labor 
standards due to their home countries.81 This pushes domestic 
companies to improve the treatment of their workers and results 
 
 75. “Presidents, however, do not pass trade agreements into law. Congress 
does.” HAFNER- BURTON, supra note 46, at 66. 
 76. See generally Lisa Lechner, The Domestic Battle over the Design of Non-
Trade Issues in Preferential Trade Agreements, REV. INT’L POL. ECON. 4–6 
(2016) (stating that large differences between member states regarding civil 
and political rights protection levels should trigger NGO activity). 
 77. AFL-CIO argues, “[i]n reality, [trade] deals have failed to promote much 
in the way of jobs at all, and have certainly failed to provide quality 
employment.” AM. FED’N OF LABOR AND CONG. OF INDUS. ORGS., NAFTA AT 20, 
6 (2014). 
 78. The AFL-CIO holds that NAFTA “allows companies to move labor 
intensive components of their operations to locations with weak laws and lax 
enforcement” which then interferes with worker’s “fundamental rights” and 
undermine bargaining power while providing foreign and multi-national 
businesses with “unique legal rights.” Id. at 4–5. See also id. at 17 (depicting a 
photo of a union members’ opinion that fast track is a race to the bottom). 
 79. Id. at 6, 8. 
 80. Id. at 11 
 81. Id. 
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in a higher bar for everyone. 
If treaties cover more ground and seek to combat negative 
effects of trade liberalization, more politicians are likely to be on 
board—on both ends of the agreement. It allows opportunities 
for policymakers to add in provisions that are important to them 
and it helps garner domestic support in Latin American 
countries where labor provisions are more of a necessity. But, 
due to the recent political and governmental policy shifts, 
particularly in the United States, this argument may be 
becoming less persuasive, or irrelevant. 
Other positive justifications for linking labor standards to 
trade treaties include coordination of labor standards on an 
international level, protecting labor rights as a subset of 
international human rights, building a middle class which can 
participate in and increase the market, and an increase of 
economic benefits and productivity of firms that comply with 
fundamental labor rights.82 Regarding the first justification, 
FTAs and PTAs provide a “venue for states to coordinate their 
labor standards”83 and facilitate a conversation, thereby 
encouraging a race to the top, rather than the bottom. This 
coordination and facilitation changes labor standards into a 
public good, rather than a cost to business.84 As to the second, 
poor labor practices may be more often viewed as violations of 
universal human rights. Labor rights are present in numerous 
international documents and treaties. The International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) includes the 
right to form and join trade unions.85 The International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) 
includes the rights to just and favorable conditions of work, fair 
wages, safe and healthy working conditions, equal opportunity 
for promotion and reasonable limitation of working hours and 
periodic holidays with pay.86 Increased labor rights will create a 
more productive workforce which will then strengthen the 
middle class and increase the market for domestic benefit, and 
also for foreign importers.87 Additionally, a stable middle class 
“is believed to be positively correlated with social peace and 
 
 82. Kagan, supra note 47, at 202–06. 
 83. Id. at 204. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. at 204–05. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. at 206. 
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stability.”88 An increase in labor rights can lead to productivity 
and profits in other ways as well. For instance, consumers may 
be willing to pay higher prices for a good or service they know 
was made in compliance with high, or international, labor 
standards.89 These reasons create justifications for including 
labor provisions with trade agreements. The next section will 
examine the results of such agreements. 
II. ANALYSIS 
This Note will now turn to an examination of FTAs between 
the United States and Latin American countries to analyze the 
effectiveness of their labor provisions. First, it will explore which 
countries enter into agreements with labor provisions and the 
nature of their labor rights. This analysis will next look at the 
obligations an agreement creates through the language it uses 
and the standards it sets, and the enforcement mechanism the 
agreement creates through potential consequences of a violation 
and dispute resolution mechanisms, or lack thereof. 
Furthermore, this section will compare two agreements—the 
United States- Chile Free Trade Agreement (Chile Agreement) 
and the United States-Colombia Trade Promotion Agreement 
(CTPA). Through this analysis and these case studies, this 
section will argue that labor provisions included in FTAs 
between the United States and Latin America can improve labor 
rights in Latin American countries, but do not effect significant 
changes in quality of working conditions, worker’s right to 
associate, and other labor standards. Agreements including hard 
labor standards are more effective as they create higher levels of 
accountability. While this is a positive outcome in some 
instances, evidence shows only countries with already decent 
labor standards will agree to them, therefore resulting in little 
to no change on a wide scale basis. Additionally, even when 
provisions include hard standards and the threat of dispute 
resolution, these mechanisms are not put into use and 
undermine the power of the provisions. This section will then 
suggest the United States only enter into trade treaties with 
hard labor standards and employ a gradual implementation 
schedule of the trade benefits when certain levels of labor 
standards are met. 
 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. at 206–07. 
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A. TRENDS IN TRADE AGREEMENTS BETWEEN THE UNITED 
STATES AND LATIN AMERICA 
The United States currently has six FTAs with eleven 
countries in Latin America, including the Dominican Republic 
Central America FTA which includes Costa Rica, the Dominican 
Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua, 
the United States-Chile FTA, United States-Peru FTA, United 
States-Colombia Trade Promotion Agreement, United States-
Panama Trade Promotion Agreement, and NAFTA (which 
includes the NAALC).90 
As of 2016, seventy-two percent of all trade-related labor 
provisions reference the ILO instruments, including the 
Declaration of Fundamental Rights listed earlier.91 This clear 
trend shows governments’ awareness of the need for economic 
and social integration, but countries have taken different 
approaches. The United States has focused on the effective 
enforcement of labor rights through legal and policy reform 
before the ratification of the agreement and also through 
“cooperative activities to build[] capacity and monitoring to 
assess progress.”92 Chile has implemented an “approach that 
relies mostly on cooperative activities to find more innovative 
and far-reaching ways to address issues with respect to labour 
practices in trading partner countries.”93 In addition to these 
cooperative policy mechanisms put into place by the United 
States and Chile, other countries are also using “technical 
cooperation” which provides technical assistance and financial 
resources to the partner country, “monitoring” systems to review 
the progress (usually in the form of reports), dispute settlement 
mechanisms, and economic disincentives as part of an 
agreement’s labor provisions.94 The goal of such provisions is to 
help ignite change within the institutional framework of a 
country and its labor laws and policies. 
 
 90. Sabina Dewan & Lucas Ronconi, U.S. Free Trade Agreements and 
Enforcement of Labor Law in Latin America 3–4 (Inter-American Dev. Bank: 
Dept. of Res. & Chief Economist, Working Paper No. IDB-WP-543 2014), 
https://publications.iadb.org/bitstream/handle/11319/6724/U.S.%20Free%20Tr
ade%20Agreements%20and%20Enforcement%20of%20Labor%20Law%20in%2
0Latin%20America.pdf;jsessionid=ABB5D492E20B406323A4C7A6C3A50B54?
sequence=1. 
 91. INT’L LABOUR ORG., supra note 14, at 2. 
 92. Id. at 3. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. at 72–73. 
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The issue of whether this trade strategy is making a 
difference still remains. In general, “estimating causal effect is 
difficult due the uniqueness of each country,” but also because 
data on the issue is relatively sparse and the agreements are still 
relatively new.95 Many of the large international organizations 
that collect labor data on a global scale only have the ability to 
do it every few years, which means there is rarely data to use to 
assess the results or effects of recently signed agreements. Many 
states do collect their own data, but the methods and 
measurements vary greatly, making it difficult to compare 
transnationally. Lastly, because the agreements and data are so 
new, and many other factors cannot be accounted for yet, it is 
only possible to speculate the effects of an agreement, rather 
than find an actual causation. There is also a self-sorting bias by 
states as well;96 this issue will be discussed in further detail 
later. Additionally, it also greatly depends on how labor rights 
and their enforcement are being measured. 
For the Latin American region as a whole, income inequality 
is growing and those who are losing jobs and income due to trade 
are not being adequately compensated.97 But, the employment 
rate for Latin America and the Caribbean increased by five 
percent from 1991 to 2014, while the world employment rate 
decreased by two percent.98 It must be noted though, that the 
vulnerable employment rate for Latin America and the 
Caribbean was at thirty-three percent in 2014.99 But, this may 
be insignificant as vulnerable workers have little access to social 
protection and enforcement of labor laws.100 
Despite this, the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) 
claims that, in general, “signing an FTA with the United States 
appears to improve enforcement of labor law” when looking at 
the number of inspectors and inspections.101 According to the 
IDB from 2000 to 2012, for the region, there has been an increase 
of nine additional inspectors per one million workers and an 
 
 95. Dewan & Ronconi, supra note 90, at 8. 
 96. Id. at 9. 
 97. INT’L LABOUR ORG., supra note 14, at 4. 
 98. World Development Indicators: Decent Work and Productive 
Employment, THE WORLD BANK, http://wdi.worldbank.org/table/2.4?tableNo=
2.4 (last updated, Jan. 3, 2017). 
 99. Id. 
 100. See Bureau of International Labor Affairs, Employment & Social 
Protection, U.S. DEP’T LAB. https://www.dol.gov/agencies/ilab/our-work/
employment. 
 101. Dewan & Ronconi, supra note 90, at 14. 
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increase of almost four inspections per one-thousand workers.102 
The productivity of labor law enforcement has increased by 
almost fifty percent.103 In contrast, the ILO data claims there 
has been a twenty percent increase in labor inspectors and a 
sixty percent increase in the number of inspections.104 But, since 
this is a regional average estimated by the ILO, naturally some 
states have seen more improvement and others have seen a 
decline in inspections. The effectiveness of the provisions, 
measured by the ILO, is based off the implementation 
mechanisms or policies at the domestic level.105 
As mentioned earlier in Section I, the United States’ labor 
provisions can be loosely categorized into two groups; soft 
standards and hard standards.106 The former is more similar to 
international human rights treaties where domestic 
governments manage their own policy commitments and are 
“soft on implementation.”107 These standards tend to be difficult 
to enforce, or lack enforcement regulations all together, on the 
international level, and are, therefore, unlikely to change the 
status of labor rights, especially in developing and oppressive 
countries.108 Human rights agreements’ (and also soft standards 
in labor provisions within PTAs’) “greatest strength is to 
mobilize human rights advocates and supply countries with 
information and motivations to internalize new norms of 
appropriate behavior.”109 But, this usually requires domestic 
non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and human rights 
advocates to take a stand against abusive governments.110 
The second category, agreements that include “hard” labor 
standards, requires parties to respect their own domestic labor 
laws, and sets actionable standards by creating dispute 
resolution mechanisms. “These fair trade regulations protecting 
human rights have cooperation benefits that are in some way 
 
 102. Id. at 9–10. 
 103. Id. 
 104. INT’L LABOUR ORG., supra note 14, at 78. 
 105. Id. at 5. 
 106. HAFNER-BURTON, supra note 46, at 142. 
 107. Id. at 142. 
 108. For example, the NAALC “commits the three countries to enforce their 
own labor regulations and to promote, through domestic law, 11 fundamental 
labor principles. There is no obligation to adopt stronger laws or adhere to 
international labor standards.” AM. FED’N OF LABOR AND CONG. OF INDUS. 
ORGS., supra note 77, at 11. 
 109. HAFNER- BURTON, supra note 46, at 144. 
 110. Id. 
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conditional on countries’ human rights actions, and the human 
rights language is embedded in an enforceable incentive 
structure designed to provide the economic and political benefits 
of preferential market access.”111 Another scholar put it 
differently: “by linking highly attractive gains from trade to the 
compliance with human rights, PTAs offer a way to withhold 
economic benefits or impose economic sanctions in the case of 
abuse, torture, or repression.”112 This quote accurately sums up 
the incentives for countries to follow the standards set by the 
PTAs and describes one of the reasons why hard standards tend 
to be more effective. 
Next, this analysis must examine whether the language in 
the provisions makes a difference to see if the soft standard 
provisions have different outcomes than the hard standards 
provisions. This Note argues the hard standards do tend to effect 
positive change, at least in human rights or labor rights 
regulations, sometimes simply because countries would not have 
otherwise adopted such policies if there was not an economic 
benefit to gain as reward.113 While agreements with hard 
standards do include enforcement power and there is an 
incentive to enter into them, labor provisions within FTAs do not 
create strong coercive power.114 
According to Hafner-Burton, most of those who enter into 
hard standards treaties are guilty of human rights abuses.115 
But, a strong argument can be made that most countries that 
agree to hard standards already have a relatively strong human 
rights record, so the labor provisions are not helping areas where 
the worst labor rights violations occur. Otherwise that states 
“agree on hard human rights standards in PTAs only if they have 
a general propensity to abide by human rights in the first 
place.”116 This means that these FTAs are being implemented in 
areas where they are somewhat unnecessary. 
 
 111. Id. at 146. 
 112. Gabriele Spilker & Tobias Bohmelt, supra note 49, at 344 (citing EMILIE 
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 113. See infra Section II.B. 
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B. UNITED STATES-CHILE FREE TRADE AGREEMENT 
The United States and Chile entered into a FTA in 2004 
with goals pursuant to the United States’ Bipartisan Trade 
Promotion Authority Act of 2002, which changed United States’ 
policy to include standards consistent with the core labor 
standards of the ILO.117 Chile has had a history of having bad 
standards for their workers 118 which motivated both parties to 
agree to labor provisions. Additionally, the United States buys 
twenty percent of Chile’s exports so Chile stood to gain a lot from 
a free trade agreement.119 The agreement would effectively 
eliminate tariffs on ninety percent of all goods thereby 
expanding Chilean exports to the United States and improving 
its international trade reputation.120 This helped to persuade 
those who were against improving workers’ rights. 
The Chile Agreement was the first agreement the United 
States entered into where the labor provisions were explicitly 
within the treaty in their own chapter, whereas previous treaties 
had labor provisions as a side agreement. The agreement was an 
example of a PTA effecting change and reform even before it was 
ratified.121 In 1999 Chile ratified the ILO conventions of the 
freedom of association and the freedom to organize and bargain 
collectively.122 In 2001, the United States succeeded in 
encouraging Chile to pass a new Labor Code, which “expands 
protections for union members, creates a system of punishments 
for unfair firings, and expands laws on freedom of association 
and the right to organize.”123 Through this, Chile showed good 
faith in their FTA negotiations with the United States and 
quieted criticizing American policymakers. This FTA shows the 
possible effects of an agreement; Chile was willing to make 
significant changes to get the United States to enter an 
agreement and so it could comply with the treaty’s obligations 
while receiving the economic trade benefits. While the language 
 
 117. INT’L LABOUR ORG., supra note 14, at 31, n.22. 
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 120. Id. 
 121. See generally Rogowsky & Chyn, supra note 44, at 127–28 (discussing 
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 122. Id. at 128. 
 123. HAFNER-BURTON, supra note 46, at 150. 
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and dispute mechanism of this treaty, which will be discussed 
next, suggest that the Chile Agreement is a soft standards 
treaty, one could argue it has some of the effects or coercive 
power of a hard standards treaty because it resulted in 
improvements and compliance in exchange for economic 
benefits. 
When examining FTAs and their effectiveness, one must 
consider the language used within the treaty itself and the 
subsequent standards it creates. Chapter Eighteen of the Chile 
Agreement holds that “[e]ach Party shall strive to ensure that 
such labor principles and the internationally recognized labor 
rights . . . are recognized and protected by its domestic law.”124 
The phrase “strive to ensure” does not create a hard and 
enforceable obligation. Rather, it reads more as a goal or 
commitment. Chilean law now provides for the “rights of 
workers to voluntarily form and join unions of their choice, 
bargain collectively, and conduct strikes,” while also prohibiting 
antiunion practices by requiring compensation or rehiring of 
workers if terminated for unionizing.125 
While the labor provisions in the Agreement included 
stricter obligations than other FTAs the United States had 
entered into, the enforcement or dispute resolution clauses of 
these provisions only permitted arbitration as a sole mechanism 
for failure to comply with the obligation to enforce its own labor 
laws, rather than violating the ILO core labor standards, which 
were included in the provisions.126 This agreement, along with 
many others categorized into the “third generation” of American 
FTAs, is highly criticized for its exclusion of dispute resolution 
mechanisms for all of the provisions.127 The agreement does 
provide for more cooperation, consultation, and review though, 
through the Labor Cooperation Mechanism and Cooperative 
Consultations.128 The Labor Cooperation Mechanism holds that 
each party designate a specific office within their labor 
department to “carry out the work . . . by developing and 
 
 124. United States-Chile Free Trade Agreement, Chile-U.S., art. 18.1, June 
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 125. U.S. Dep’t of State, Off. of Inv. Aff., Chile - 9.2-Labor Policies & 
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 127. INT’L LABOUR ORG., supra note 14, at 43. 
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pursuing cooperative activities on labor matters.”129 These 
activities include exchanging information regarding labor 
policies and their application in the Parties’ territory, advance 
better understanding of how to effectively implement the ILO 
Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work and 
its Follow Up, arrange review sessions at the request of either 
Party, and develop recommendations to their respective 
governments.130 The Cooperative Consultations clause provides 
that a “Party may request consultations with the other Party 
regarding any matter arising under” the labor provisions 
through a written request.131 
After addressing the treaty itself, this analysis must now 
turn to an examination of the results and effects of the treaty. 
While an important step toward change and improvement in the 
human rights arena is creating awareness and reforming the 
legal standards, it does not always effect immediate change in 
the real world. The analysis of statistics here is relatively 
speculative as no statistical tests or scientific analysis of data 
has been carried out. However, a comparison of different 
benchmarks and time points from a variety of sources are 
available. According to Export.gov, a site that aims to advise 
foreign investors, there are “no gaps in compliance with 
international labor standards that may pose a reputational risk 
to investors.”132 But statistics and general sentiment seem to 
suggest otherwise; significant improvement is visible in some 
areas but not in others. 
Before General Pinochet’s period of military rule, Chile’s 
labor and employment regime included strong firm-level unions 
and “active state intervention in the determination of wages, 
prices, and other aspects of the industrial relations,” while 
Chilean workers “enjoyed numerous protections and social 
service benefits.”133 During the Pinochet era, almost all labor 
rights, among other human rights, were suspended, but in 1979 
a new labor code was adopted which provided again for firm-
level unions, and temporary or subcontracted workers.134 Later, 
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in 1988, due to Chile’s “regular abuse of worker rights” and lack 
of compliance with internationally recognized worker rights, the 
United States suspended its trade benefits with the country.135 
Finally, in the 1990s after Pinochet had been ousted, the Chilean 
government started to restore its labor code, and bring it into 
compliance with the international standards at the time.136 
Trade union membership grew substantially. In 2001, 
10.3% of the workforce were union members and 37,000 
members were added in 2002.137 The Ministry of Labor and 
Social Welfare, more specifically, the Labor Directorate, is 
responsible for administering and enforcing labor and 
employment laws.138 In 2003, The Chilean government had 
committed to hiring 300 more inspectors nationwide.139 
In 2004, the year the treaty was to take effect and a few 
years after Chile’s new Labor Code was passed, approximately 
ten percent of the workforce was unionized, minimum wage was 
$196 a month, which “did not provide a worker and family with 
a decent standard of living,” and the work week was forty-eight 
hours.140 In 2008, thirteen percent of the workforce was 
unionized, minimum wage was $305 per month, but still did not 
provide a decent standard of living, and the work week usually 
consisted of forty-five hours per week.141 In 2015, the minimum 
wage was $345 per month, which was significantly above the 
poverty line.142 This was the first time that this minimum wage 
requirement also applied to domestic workers, as the rule was 
implemented in 2011.143 The ILO database holds that the trade 
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union density as a percentage of total paid employment was 
11.6% in 2004 and 15.7% in 2012.144 From 1991 to 2016, the 
employment rate increased by 7.4% (as compared to the 5% 
increase within Latin America and the Caribbean overall) as 
well.145 Overall, there was low compliance to minimum wage 
requirements from 1990–2006, but an increase in compliance 
from 2006–2009.146 Furthermore, there was a large reduction in 
violations in general during 2006–2009, which could be 
attributed to the increased government enforcement due to the 
trade agreement.147 These statistics show improvement since 
the implementation of the FTA and its labor provisions, but the 
majority were made before the treaty went into effect. See Figure 
1 for a summary of these statistics. 
 
 2001 2004 2008 2011 2015 
Union 
Membership 
10% 10% 13% NA NA 
Minimum 
Wage (per 
month, USD) 
NA $196 $205 Minimum wage 
applicable to 
domestic 
workers 
$345 
Figure 1: Summary of Chilean Workers’ Conditions 
 
Chilean workers are guaranteed the freedom to associate or 
unionize, without prior approval, and cannot be forced to join or 
withdraw from a trade union as a condition for employment.148 
In 2003, strikes by public sector workers were prohibited and 
thirty companies were designated at essential services, in which 
strikes are prohibited as well.149 According to the new labor code, 
passed in 2001, employers can hire replacement workers after 
fifteen days of strikes, save a few exceptions.150 The ILO 
suggested to the Chilean government to change that portion of 
its labor code, but the legislature refused.151 But, the new code 
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“significantly enhances the legal protections given to trade 
unionists against unfair dismissal,” as prior to the reform, 
employers regularly terminated employees for participation in 
strikes.152 The code also provides for higher compensations for 
those workers unfairly terminated,153 but this has not 
completely fixed the issue. Additionally, a 2007 International 
Trade Union Confederation Report “identified continuing 
antiunion practices like barring union’s leaders’ access to 
companies, replacement of striking workers, and threatening 
dismissal to prevent formation of trade unions.”154 The Labor 
Directorate had 720 labor inspectors as of 2015, but the report 
expressed a need for more and claimed that fines did not have a 
deterrent effect on labor violations for larger employers.155 
Overall, improvement can be seen since the passing of the 
2001 labor code and the signing of the United States-Chile FTA, 
but more work is needed in terms of enforcement, conviction and 
fine collection, and overall effectiveness of the legal labor and 
employment obligations. It is important to note that most of the 
changes came from the reformed labor code in 2001, before the 
agreement was signed. This shows a country’s willingness to 
prove its commitment to labor rights improvements to receive 
the economic and political benefits of an FTA with the United 
States, but a lack of coercive power from soft standards. 
The next section will analyze the United States-Colombia 
FTA which is included in the “fourth generation” of America’s 
labor provision with FTAs. After examining the language and 
effects of the treaty, this Note will compare the two agreements 
to see if one had a significantly different outcome. 
C. UNITED STATES-COLOMBIA TRADE PROMOTION AGREEMENT 
The United States and Colombia signed the Trade 
Promotion Agreement (CTPA), which included detailed hard 
labor standards, in 2006, but it did not go into effect until 2012. 
CTPA is considered “comprehensive” as it eliminates tariffs, 
removes barriers to United States services and includes 
provisions regulating customs administration, trade facilitation, 
government procurement, investment, telecommunications, 
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electronic devices commerce, intellectual property (IP) rights, 
environmental and labor protections.156 Once again, both 
countries had a lot to gain from such a trade deal. For the United 
States, Colombia has the third largest economy in Latin 
America, and eighty percent of American consumer and 
industrial goods exports from Colombia would no longer be 
subject to tariffs, with the rest being gradually phased out.157 
For Colombia, the United States is its largest trading partner, 
making up almost thirty-four percent of its total trade, making 
elimination of tariffs highly beneficial.158 
The parties also created a side accord titled the Colombian 
Action Plan Related to Labor Rights (the Plan) in 2011 to 
address labor standards and meet the laid out requirements in 
the larger agreement.159 The Plan required twenty-five different 
measures be taken by Colombia before the deal would be 
submitted to United States Congress for approval, another 
example of reform before the treaty was put into effect.160 This 
was the first time that Congressional approval of a trade treaty 
was contingent on achieving specific labor benchmarks.161 
Similar changes were made before the signing of the Chile 
Agreement to show good faith, but, distinct from the Colombian 
agreement, it was not required in writing.162 CTPA was not put 
into effect until May 2012 when the requirements of the Plan 
had been deemed met.163 
The analysis will now move to the specified standards set 
out by the Agreement and the Labor Action Plan and analyze 
the language used. The Plan’s requirements included a creation 
of a specialized Labor Ministry, criminal code and criminal 
justice reform for employers “that undermined the right to 
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organize and bargain collectively,” implementation of “a regime 
to prevent the use of temporary service agencies to circumvent 
labor rights,” cooperation with the ILO, and broaden the scope 
of its protection programs, among others.164 Chapter Seventeen 
of CTPA, the Chapter dedicated to labor, reaffirms the parties’ 
obligation as members of the ILO and stipulates that “each Party 
shall adopt and maintain in its statutes and regulations, and 
practices” the principles laid out in the ILO Declaration on 
Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work and its Follow-
Up.165 These principles include: “1) freedom of association; 2) 
effective recognition of the right to collective bargaining; 3) the 
elimination of all forms of compulsory or forced labor; 4) the 
effective abolition of child labor and a prohibition on the worst 
forms of child labor; and 5) the elimination of discrimination in 
respect of employment and occupation.”166 While “a Party shall 
not fail to effectively enforce its labor laws,” there leaves a lot of 
room for discretion of implementation: “[e]ach Party retains the 
right to the reasonable exercise of discretion and to a bona fide 
decision with regard to the allocation of resources between labor 
enforcement activities among the fundamental labor rights 
enumerated.”167 Additionally though, parties must guarantee 
citizens access to tribunals for enforcement of states’ labor 
laws.168 The Agreement’s dispute resolution chapter, Chapter 
Twenty-One, provides that mechanisms may be triggered in 
regard to any and all provisions within the Agreement.169 This 
means that all of the included labor provisions are enforceable 
through consultations, interventions of the Commission, or 
arbitration. The CTPA clearly lays out the stipulations and 
guidelines of an arbitral panel if one is needed.170 
It is clear from a close analysis of the language of the CTPA 
that it creates hard, more tangible and enforceable standards as 
compared to other agreements. However, one must look to see if 
this results in more significant changes and improvements in 
real life. Because the agreement is so recent, it is difficult to 
measure the change since its implementation, but some 
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improvements can be seen. Colombia has since implemented 
laws that strengthen workers’ protections, and employ new labor 
inspectors and police investigators to enforce the laws and 
counter the violence against unions.171 
In 2004, the United States Department of State reported 
large scale human rights violations, violence against union 
members, and prevalence of anti-union discrimination, 
including arbitrary detention of unionists by the government.172 
Only four percent of the labor force belonged to a union and there 
were very few successful prosecutions of alleged crimes against 
union members.173 Additionally, “47% [sic] of workers earned 
wages that were insufficient to cover the costs of the 
Government’s estimated low-income family shopping basket.”174 
While the actual legislation in place at the time did provide for 
comprehensive protection of workers, there was a lack of 
government inspectors, thereby undermining the laws.175 
According to the 2008 Colombia Labor Rights Report,176 labor 
law was administered by the Ministry of Social Protection 
(Ministerio de la Protección Social) (MPS) which encompassed 
the Ministries of Labor, Social Security and Health.177 The Vice 
Minister of Labor Affairs oversaw the departments of Labor 
Protection (responsible for enforcing rights of workers), 
Employment Promotion (encompassing employment creation 
and skill development programs), and the Labor Inspectorate 
(responsible for enforcing labor and employment law).178 In 
2008, the Colombian Constitution and Labor Code provided that 
all employees (except police and armed forces) had a right to join 
a trade union and employers were prohibited from modifying 
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working conditions or terminating employment in retaliation of 
union membership.179 Despite this, the United States State 
Department reported only 742,000 workers, or about four 
percent of the workforce, were union members in 2007.180 In 
2010, the United States reported a 4.4% union membership 
rate.181 Additionally, government regulations pertaining to 
union formation and registration made the process extremely 
slow, and many claim it was used as a way to block unionization, 
but the Colombian government denies this.182 Statistics 
regarding union membership since the Plan were unable to be 
found, so its effect is unclear. This notion was supported by the 
ILO Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions 
and Recommendations (CEACR), which also noted the 
Colombian government was engaging in arbitrary rejections of 
new unions and union rules and using discretion beyond the 
parameters given to it by the relevant legislation.183 Workers, 
except those in essential public services, had the right to strike 
and employers were prohibited from hiring replacement 
workers, except for essential personal, during a legal strike.184 
But, the MPS had relatively broad authority to determine the 
legality of strikes, which would then allow employers to hire 
replacement workers and punish strike participants.185 
Furthermore, the ILO CEACR held that Colombia’s labor code 
strike prohibitions covers too wide a range of services that are 
not considered essential.186 
According to the 2011 United States Department of Labor 
Report, in conjunction with the Plan, Colombia re-established a 
separate Ministry of Labor and made a commitment to hire 480 
new inspectors.187 As of 2016, the Colombian government has 
come close to carrying out this commitment as it has hired over 
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400 new inspectors.188 Colombia’s Congress passed legislation 
establishing criminal penalties for those who undermine 
workers’ rights to organization and collective bargaining in June 
2011.189 Even though additional prosecutors were added to focus 
solely on these crimes and 278 cases have been initiated, only 
five of them have gone or are currently at trial.190 Also, in 
response to the CEACR’s claim, Colombia agreed to collect 
Colombian doctrine and case law to create guidelines narrowing 
the definition of “essential services” and to provide this 
information to the judiciary, inspectors, unions, and 
employers.191 Due to these improvements caused by the CTPA 
and the Plan, United States estimates there are 150,000 new 
union members since 2011.192 In 2015, the United States 
Department of State reported that training of labor inspectors 
has continued and increased, and two successful collective 
bargaining agreements were reached in areas they never had 
been before.193 
While many labor rights laws were already in place before 
the CTPA and the Plan were effected, it is widely held that they 
were not enforced. One group goes as far as to hold that 
Colombia is the most dangerous place to be a trade union 
member.194 This group also holds that the Colombian 
government has devoted resources to a public relations 
campaign in order to convince the international community that 
they are tackling anti-union violence.195 While a certain political 
bias must be considered, this gives a glimpse of Colombian 
Nationals’ attitudes towards the issue. In 2006, the United 
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States said that there was a high rate of violence against trade 
union members, and in 2008, held that it was still a persistent 
problem, but there had been a decline in this violence since 
2002.196 One incident, for instance, resulted in the death of the 
Treasurer of the Union of Judicial Employees in 2015, among 
others in recent years.197 In 2016, the United States Department 
of Labor recognized the success of Colombia’s protection program 
that was implemented in 2011, and that there was a decline in 
the homicide rate against trade union members.198 But, there 
seems to be a long way to go to completely eradicate this violence. 
Colombia does not have a great record in terms of working 
conditions and minimum wage either. In 2008, only 1.9 million 
of the 7.4 million people in the formal workforce were receiving 
the government mandated minimum wage.199 Specific violations 
were cited in the cut flower industry (one of the largest 
industries for Colombia) due to workers working past the 48 
hour maximum and not being sufficiently compensated for their 
overtime.200 The minimum wage per month was $216 in 2015, a 
4.6% increase.201 Colombia’s Labor Code requires “employers to 
provide equipment and workplaces that guarantee the security 
and health of workers and to adopt safety and health measures 
to ‘protect the life, health, and morality of workers in their 
service’.”202 Workers also have the right remove themselves from 
dangerous working conditions, but research reveals that many 
do not due to fear of job loss or other employer retaliation.203 
Overall, in 2008, the United States found a high level of 
accidents and unsafe working conditions in Colombia.204 
Additionally, while there has been an increase in enforcement of 
punishment for international labor rights violations through 
fines, there reportedly is not a system put in place to collect those 
fines and it is still one of the largest undermining factors of 
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Colombia’s labor laws.205 
Through speculation of these statistics, it appears, in its 
short tenure, CTPA and the Plan has effected some positive 
change, but more still must be done. Specifically, the 
international community should watch for the trends in anti-
union labor violence as that is one of the ILO core labor rights 
Colombia agreed to. It is very important to consider the 
structure and timing of the changes, as most changes occurred 
in 2011 due to hard standards included in the Plan, before the 
United States Congress would agree to put the treaty into effect. 
This acts somewhat as self-imposed hard standards by Colombia 
and proves the effectiveness of economic incentives. 
D. HARD OR SOFT STANDARDS: ARE EITHER EFFECTIVE? 
In comparing the Chile Agreement and the CTPA, it appears 
the latter has been more effective, especially in terms of policy 
changes, even in its short time. Both agreements did trigger 
statutory and regulatory change before they were signed by both 
parties, but the CTPA has clearer, higher, and enforceable 
standards.206 PTAs do not have high coercive power, nor can they 
force states into doing something, meaning they lack strong 
enforcement power, which is rarely triggered anyway. PTAs may 
help to induce domestic policy change and enforcement if they 
include hard human rights standards “by linking highly 
attractive gains from trade to the compliance with human rights, 
PTAs offer a way to withhold economic benefits or impose 
economic sanctions in the case of abuse, torture, or 
repression.”207 
There are two problems to address in increasing the 
effectiveness of labor provisions within FTAs. The first is that 
countries will agree to and even implement improved labor laws 
to gain an economic advantage through a trade treaty, but will 
not enforce these new laws. One can argue that governments 
oppose human rights provisions and do not plan on 
implementing them domestically. This can be seen in Chile’s 
case, and somewhat in Colombia’s case, as the countries now 
have the proper framework, but lack the commitment to enforce 
those laws and regulations. 
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The second issue is that while “hard standards” treaties 
seem to be better, it is likely that only countries with already 
decent labor rights records or laws will agree to such “hard 
standards” agreements.208 Or, one could argue that countries 
enter such agreements only if they have a general tendency to 
comply with the human rights provisions. Colombia’s 
Constitution, labor code, and relevant administrative agencies 
already legally guaranteed relatively strong labor rights, but 
was lacking an effective investigation and enforcement system. 
Following this argument, this means that labor rights provisions 
are not being implemented in areas that have the worst records, 
or areas that could benefit the most from such an agreement. 
According to a study where data was collected on PTAs from 
1976 to 2009, such agreements are unlikely to affect human 
rights compliance when controlling for the selection bias.209 
E. PROPOSED SOLUTION: GRADUAL IMPLEMENTATION OF HARD 
STANDARDS WITH ENFORCEMENT MECHANISMS 
To overcome and reduce these identified issues with labor 
provisions within PTAs between the United States and Latin 
America, the United States should employ a policy in which all 
treaties are negotiated with hard labor standards, but 
implemented at a gradual rate. It can be somewhat of a hybrid 
of the types of agreements examined in this Note—the United 
States should require a minimum level of compliance to enter 
into the treaty, and gradually increase the level of standards or 
level of compliance allowing the governments to meet the new 
standards over time. To create an incentive for gradual 
implementation, a simultaneous gradual decrease and 
elimination of tariffs and other trade barriers will occur. Such a 
policy will address both issues because it will increase the 
coercive power of treaties by increasing the ability and incentive 
for states with poor labor rights records and laws to enter into 
treaties with hard standards. This approach is likely to be more 
effective than agreements including soft labor standards 
because it allows time for a nation’s laws and practice to adjust 
while creating enforcement power. 
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Implementing this approach would be somewhat similar to 
what the United States did with Chile and Colombia, 
implementing change before signing the agreement, but would 
increase the benefits and incentives on both sides. In Colombia, 
the United States Department of Labor has installed a full-time 
attaché in order to monitor and assist the implementation of the 
standards required by the Plan and the CTPA.210 The United 
States has stated that “fully and effectively addressing” the 
standards of the Plan and the CTPA will require “intensive and 
continued engagement over time.”211 This proves that 
achievement of such hard labor standards does take time and 
cannot occur quickly, further supporting the need for a gradual 
implementation scheme. Instead of the United States waiting to 
receive any benefits while the Latin American country meets the 
agreement’s requirements, the United States could share in the 
reciprocity of decreased trade barriers. This could also increase 
the incentive for faster implementation of the core labor rights 
and new domestic policies. A counter argument to this approach 
is that it requires a large amount of resources on the part of the 
United States. The United States funded an almost $10 million 
project from 2012 – 2016 in conjunction with the ILO to assist 
Colombia in strengthening the capacity of their Ministry of 
Labor.212 One could refute this argument in that the economic 
and political access and relationship gained from a PTA is worth 
those resources to the United States. 
Gradual implementation of treaty provisions has been used 
in the implementation of international human rights treaties. 
Labor provisions in PTAs are similar to human rights treaties in 
that they must be integrated at the domestic level.213 An 
argument can be made that they also share legal factors which 
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impact the implementation of human rights provisions (either 
from a human rights treaty or a PTA). These factors include: “the 
conceptualisation of the relation between international and 
domestic legal orders (1); the status of treaties in the domestic 
legal order and their place in the hierarchy of norms (2); the 
direct and indirect effect and the interpretation of conformity 
clauses in the domestic constitutions (3); and the existence of 
legislation enabling the reception of human rights treaties into 
the domestic legal order (4).”214 In terms of realistic and 
potential solutions to increase the effectiveness of the 
implementation of labor provisions (and human rights 
provisions), it makes the most sense to focus on the fourth 
factor—domestic legislation. The first three factors are very 
entrenched in the constitutional system of a country and 
therefore much more difficult to change. Additionally, “states 
may not invoke their own domestic law as a justification” for a 
treaty violation, and must conform their domestic law to that of 
their international obligations.215 All of this means 
implementing labor provisions in PTAs goes hand in hand with 
implementing new domestic legislation and regulations. But, it 
is well-known that changes to domestic policy, in any country, 
takes significant time, and even more time to successfully 
implement and enforce that policy, hence the need for a 
graduated implementation policy. 
The general idea is that economic trade benefits such as 
tariff reduction or elimination would occur in exchange for 
progress made in regard to labor rights in parties’ domestic 
systems. This progress could be measured simply by the passing 
of new legislation, but it will likely be more effective if it also 
requires implementation of new policies, regulations and 
enforcement systems of those new policies. Objective measures 
could also be employed, for example, requiring a specific amount 
of new labor inspectors or requiring the government to grant a 
certain number of new trade unions. This system could create a 
required benchmark system following the ILO standards and the 
obligations set forth within the agreement which uses more 
readily available and easily accessible data. Following the 
information and measurements mentioned earlier in this Note, 
the agreement could require a certain monthly wage, working 
hours per week, passage of new working conditions (safety and 
health) regulations, or an increase in labor union participation, 
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or a clear effort to encourage labor union participation. Such a 
system would create an incentive for the other party, likely the 
Latin American country, to actually bring the labor provisions 
into law and enforce them, as it would then be receiving 
economic benefits. While this may seem like a one sided, 
powerful versus powerless situation, it would also create an 
incentive for the United States to help its treaty partners to 
implement such provisions as the United States stands to 
benefit substantially from reduced or eliminated tariffs or other 
concessions agreed upon in the PTA as they are met. 
III. CONCLUSION 
With a shift in the nature of international trade agreements 
from large scale multilateral WTO agreements to bilateral or 
Plurilateral FTAs, the nature of agreements and the obligations 
they create are also shifting. It is increasingly common for States 
to enter comprehensive bilateral or regional FTAs including 
human rights provisions. Due to the increased attention to 
human rights, specifically labor rights, in recent years, the world 
has seen the frequency and the extent of violations in these 
fields, by both private and public parties. Such provisions show 
an awareness of these violations and the need for progress and 
change, especially regarding labor rights, but the results of such 
provisions do not seem to meet their maximum potential effect. 
This Note has discussed the structure and language of 
different types of labor provisions within FTAs, specifically 
between the United States and Latin American countries (where 
labor rights violations are too common). It has examined the 
motivations behind labor rights provisions and the results of the 
different types of provisions. The United States-Chile and 
United States-Colombia FTAs were used as case studies to allow 
comparison between a treaty including somewhat soft 
standards, and a treaty including hard standards, respectively. 
Using specific agreements allowed for an analysis of the 
circumstances of labor rights before and after the agreements 
were signed to be done, speculating the effectiveness of such 
provisions. 
In the case of Chile, the act of entering into the agreement 
was effective as Chile made significant improvements to their 
labor laws and inspections system in order to show their good 
faith in continuing out such behavior once the treaty was signed. 
This evidence supports the notion that countries are more likely 
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to meet strict, albeit unofficial, benchmarks when there is an 
economic reward as a result. But, what seems to be because of 
poor enforcement systems and lack of strong obligations, there 
has not been significant changes to labor rights in Chile since 
the treaty was put into effect. After the Colombia TPA, which 
included stricter language of labor standards and stronger 
enforcement mechanisms, some noticeable legal changes have 
been made, but the country has been less successful in 
implementing and enforcing these changes in a short amount of 
time. These results show once again that benchmarks can be 
met, but a better implementation plan is necessary. 
This Note holds that FTAs including hard labor standards 
are more likely to be effective, but countries with the worst 
violations are not likely to enter into them due to the high and 
enforceable standards, which decreases their coercive power. 
This Note suggests that the United States only enter into 
agreements requiring objective measurable change through 
hard standards and creating enforcement mechanisms. The 
proposed solution, the requirement of gradual implementation 
of labor standards coupled with gradual access to economic trade 
benefits, will increase the coercive power and effectiveness of 
FTAs through more attainable and realistic benchmarks and 
mutual benefits to both parties. FTAs between the United States 
and Latin American countries have immense potential to enact 
significant change to labor rights in Latin America, but must be 
implemented through more effective means. 
